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FIFTH AMENDMENT-DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: LEGISLATIVE INTENT
CONTROLS IN CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS
Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S.Ct. 673 (1983).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause1 prohibits punishing a defendant twice for the same
offense. 2 The Court held in Missouri v. Hunter,3 however, that once the
legislature has clearly declared its intent to impose more than one penalty for any given criminal act, the guarantee against double jeopardy
cannot protect a convicted person from the imposition of multiple punishments. When all charges are brought at a single trial, the issue is
merely one of statutory construction: the Double Jeopardy Clause places
no restraint on the power of a legislative body to define crimes and prescribe punishments.

II.

BACKGROUND: Missoui

vP HUNTER

Danny Hunter and two accomplices robbed an A & P store in Kansas City, Missouri. While the robbery was in progress, a store employee
alerted the police. An officer arrived at the store and ordered the three
to stop. Hunter fired at the officer, who returned the fire. Hunter then
escaped with his accomplices. The three were later apprehended and
positively identified by both the officer and the store manager. Hunter
made an oral and written confession which was admitted into evidence
at trial, but offered no direct evidence in his own defense. 4 He was convicted of robbery in the first degree, 5 armed criminal action, 6 and asI The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.
... U.S. Const. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment was
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
2 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
3 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983).
4 Id. at 675.
5 At the time of Hunter's trial, Missouri's armed robbery statute provided:
Every person who shall be convicted of feloniously taking the property of another from
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sault with malice.7 Hunter was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten
years imprisonment for the robbery and fifteen years for the armed
criminal action, and to a consecutive term of five years for the assault.
Thus, Hunter's total sentence was twenty years. 8
Hunter appealed his sentence to the Missouri Court of Appeals,
claiming that his sentence for both robbery in the first degree and armed
criminal action violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. 9 The Missouri Court of Appeals agreed and reversed both the conviction and the fifteen year
sentence for armed criminal action. 10 The state's alternative motion for
rehearing or transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was denied by the
appellate court," and the Missouri Supreme Court itself denied review
two months later.' 2 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,' 3 and in a six to two decision 14 vacated and remanded, holding:
Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment
under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the
"same" conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of statutory construction
is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may
his person, or in his presence, and against his will, by violence to his person, or by putting
him in fear of some immediate injury to his person; or who shall be convicted of feloniously taking the property of another from the person of his wife, servant, clerk or agent,
in charge thereof, and against the will of such wife, servant, clerk or agent by violence to
the person of such wife, servant, clerk or agent, or by putting him or her in fear of some
immediate injury to his or her person, shall be adjudged guilty of robbery in the first
degree.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.120 (Vernon 1979). This section has since been recodified without
substantial modification at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.020 (Vernon 1979).
6 Missouri's armed criminal action statute provides:
[A]ny person who commits any felony under the laws of this state by, with, or through
the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of
armed criminal action and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment by the
division of corrections for a term of not less than three years. The punishment imposed
pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to any punishment provided by law for
the crime committed by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or
deadly weapon. No person convicted under this subsection shall be eligible for parole,
probation, conditional release or suspended imposition or execution of sentence for a
period of three calendar years.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.225 (Vernon 1979)(recodification without revision at Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 571.015, in effect at the time of Hunter's trial).
7 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.050 (Vernon 1979).
8 103 S. Ct. at 676.
9 State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374 (1981).
10 Id. at 375. The Missouri Court of Appeals relied entirely on the Missouri Supreme
Court's holdings in State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1981); Sours v. State, 593 S.W.2d
208 (Mo.), vacated, 446 U.S. 962 (1980)(Sours I); and Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981)(Sours II).
11Id.
12 Id.
13 102 S. Ct. 1767 (1982).
14 Chief Justice Burger wrote the Court's opinion, which was joined by all the Justices

except Justices Marshall and Stevens, who dissented.
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impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial. 15

III.

THE MAJORITY OPINION: LEGISLATIVE INTENT CONTROLS

The Hunter case is the product of a long tug-of-war between the
Missouri Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.1 6 In
1980, in Sours v. State 17 (Sours 1), the Missouri Supreme Court held that

under the test of Blockburger v. United States 8 armed criminal action and
15 103 S. Ct. at 679. See infra note 18 for a discussion of Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932).
16 The armed criminal action statute was first enacted in Missouri in 1927. When the
Missouri Supreme Court first addressed the question, it held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
did not prohibit conviction and sentencing for both armed criminal action and the underlying felony. State v. Treadway, 558 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978);
see State v. Valentine, 584 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1979).
In 1980, after the Supreme Court held in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977)(per
curiam), that the underlying felony is the same offense as felony murder under the Blockburger
test, see infta note 18, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed itself. The Missouri Supreme
Court held in Sours v. State, 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.), vacated, 447 U.S. 962 (1980), that conviction and sentencing under both the armed robbery statute and the armed criminal action
statute violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded with directions to reconsider the decision in light of Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684 (1980). Sours, 447 U.S. at 962; see inJfa note 29 and accompanying text. On remand,
the Missouri Supreme Court adhered to its previous position and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. See 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1131 (1981)
(Sours 1).
The Missouri Supreme Court and the three districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals
then began reversing many armed criminal action convictions on double jeopardy grounds.
The Missouri Supreme Court held in 1982 that, for the sake of uniformity, all armed criminal
action sentences should be reversed. See State v. Kane, 629 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Mo. 1982). The
state sought and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a number of these
cases, then vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981). Throughout this period, the Missouri courts continued to hold
that conviction and sentencing under both statutes violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. See
Missouri v. Counselman, 450 U.S. 990 (198 1)(certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and
cases remanded for further consideration in light of Albernaz) (five cases); Missouri v. Brown,
450 U.S. 1027 (1981)(same) (five cases); Missouri v. Sinclair, 452 U.S. 912 (1981) (same)(two
cases); Missouri v. Crews, 452 U.S. 957 (1981) (same)(three cases); Missouri v. Greer, 451 U.S.
1013 (1981) (same)(three cases); State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 49 n.2 (Mo. 1981).
17 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.), vacated, 447 U.S. 962 (1980)(Sours ,). Sours, like Hunter, was
convicted of and sentenced for both armed robbery and armed criminal action.
18 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Blockburger test has been used for many years to determine
whether two statutory violations constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.
Blockburger involved a five count indictment charging federal narcotics violations. The defendant was convicted on three of the five counts, all of which charged sales to the same
purchaser. Counts two and three charged sales on consecutive days to the same purchaser,
count three charged the sale of a drug not in the original package, and count five charged the
same sale as having been made not in pursuance of the purchaser's written order as required
by the statute. Id. at 301. The petitioner argued that the sales charged in counts two and
three were the same offense because they were made to the same purchaser, and that counts
three and five referred to the same sale and thus also constituted a single offense. Id. at 30102. The Court disagreed, stating: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to deter-
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the underlying felony of robbery first degree are the "same offense."' 9
The Missouri court therefore held that even though the Missouri Legislature had manifested its clear intent that a defendant should be subject
to conviction and sentencing under both statutes for a single offense, the
Double Jeopardy Clause "prohibits imposing punishment for both
'20
armed criminal action and for the underlying felony."

The Missouri Supreme Court adhered to this position when Sours I
was vacated and remanded 2 ' for reconsideration in light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. United States. 22 Finally, in
mine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of
1
an additional fact which the other does not." Id. at 304.
The Court reasoned that, even though counts three and five involved the same sale, that
sale violated two distinct statutory provisions. Id. at 303. The first was § 1 of the Harrison
Narcotic Act, 26 U.S.C. § 692 (1917), which created the offense ofselling certain drugs except
from the original package. The second was § 2 of the same act, 26 U.S.C. § 696, prohibiting
the sale of those drugs except on written order. Two distinct offenses were created and the
defendant committed both of them in a single act. Each offense required proof of an element
that the other did not. Id. at 304. Thus, they could not be the same offense for double
jeopardy purposes. See also Pandelli v. United States, 635 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1980); supra note
26.
The Blockburger test was first set out in Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 343-44
(1911). The test has been repeatedly used and reaffirmed. See, e.g. , Simpson v. United States,
435 U.S. 6 (1978); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137
(1977); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
19 Sours, 593 S.W.2d at 210. Because the armed criminal action elements are present
whenever a dangerous weapon is used to commit a felony, the armed criminal action statute
will always apply when any armed felony is charged. See supra notes 5-6. The Missouri
Supreme Court considered only the United States Constitution because the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Missouri constitution has been interpreted to apply only to an attempt to retry
a defendant after a jury's acquittal. See Murray v. State, 475 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Mo. 1972);
Kansas City v. Henderson, 468 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Ward
v. State, 451 S.W.2d 79, 81 (1970). Since the convictions in Hunter were obtained in a single
trial, the Missouri constitution, art. I, § 19, does not apply. Sours, 593 S.W.2d at 211.
20 Sours, 593 S.W.2d at 223. Rhode Island and Tennessee courts also have found convictions under similar armed violence statutes to violate double jeopardy. The defendant in
State v. Boudreau, 113 R.I. 497, 322 A.2d 626 (1974), was convicted of eight counts of assault
with a deadly weapon and one court of armed violence. On appeal, the armed violence
conviction was reversed because the court held it was the same offense as the assault under the
Blockburger test and the defendant could not be punished under both statutes. Id. at 503, 322
A.2d at 629. In State v. Hudson, 562 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. 1978), the defendant was convicted
in one trial of four offenses, including armed robbery and a firearms felony, arising out of an
armed bank robbery. The court held that the separate convictions for armed robbery and the
firearms felony could not stand without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court
construed the firearms felony statute to provide for additional punishment, not for a separate
conviction. Id. at 419.
21 Missouri v. Sours, 446 U.S. 962 (1980).
22 445 U.S. 684 (1980); see infra note 29. In reconsidering Sours, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that, notwithstanding the acknowledged intent of the legislature to impose two
separate punishments for the two offenses, armed criminal action and the underlying felony
are the same offense for which double punishment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981)(Sours 11).
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State v. Haggard,23 the Missouri Supreme Court again affirmed its belief
that concurrent sentencing for both armed criminal action and the underlying felony constituted a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause:
Until such time as the Supreme Court of the United States declares clearly
and unequivocally that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not apply to the legislative
branch of government, we cannot do other than what we perceive to be
punishments for the same offense
our duty to refuse to enforce multiple
24
arising out of a single transaction.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority in Missouri v. Hunter
gives the Missouri Supreme Court the clear statement it requested: after
Hunter, legislative intent controls whether cumulative punishments can
be applied for violations of multiple statutes by a single criminal transaction. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that although the double jeopardy clause does prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense,
this prohibition is applicable only where separate trials are held. When
cumulative sentences are imposed in a single trial for conduct arising
out of a single criminal transaction, "the Double Jeopardy Clause does
no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended." 25 Thus, where legislative intent is clear, double jeopardy does not bar multiple sentences for convic26
tions arising out of the same offense.
In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Burger relied principally
on two recent cases, Whalen v. United States27 and Albernaz v. United
States.281 The earlier case, Whalen, involved cumulative punishments for
rape and felony murder, rape being the underlying felony. The Court
held that the offenses were the same under the Blockburger test, since the
23 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1981). Haggard was also appealing his sentence for both armed
robbery and armed criminal action.
24 Id. at 51.

25 Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 678.
26 The Double Jeopardy Clause operates as a presumption against a finding that the legislature intends to define multiple offenses and to prescribe multiple punishments, a presumption that can be overcome only by "clear and unmistakeable" evidence. Westen, The Three
FacesofDoubleJeopardy."Refections on Government Appeals of CriminalSentences, 78 MICH. L. REV.
1101, 1126-27 (1980). This presumption frees the legislature to define offenses and sentences
as it desires by requiring the courts to adhere to legislative schemes of punishment that are
"clear and unmistakeable." Yet, it also permits the courts to reject judicial interpretations of
the law, by authorizing the courts to subject multiple punishment to constitutional review,
and to invalidate such punishment wherever the evidence for its intended existence is less
than clear. The presumption is the only formulation that can give constitutional content to
the clause without intruding upon the legislature's authority to define offenses and penalties
because other constructions inevitably render the double jeopardy clause either unduly intrusive or entirely meaningless. Id.
27 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
28 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
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felony murder could not have been proved without proof of the rape. 29
Because the Court in Whalen did not find a clear legislative intent to
authorize cumulative punishment for the same offense, and, in fact, did
find some indication that Congress had not intended punishment to be
cumulative under the two statutes unless they satisfied the Blockburger
test and were not the "same offense,"' 30 the Court held that the appellant could not be punished under both statutes. In Hunter, Chief Justice
Burger explained that the Whalen result "turned on the fact that the
Court saw no 'clear indication of contrary legislative intent.' ")31
Chief Justice Burger also relied heavily on Albernaz v. UnitedStates.32
There the Court found that the defendants' convictions for conspiracy
to import and conspiracy to distribute marijuana did not constitute the
same offense under the Blockburger test. 33 The Hunter majority found it
significant that once the Court held the convictions in Albernaz to constitute separate offenses, the Court "might well have stopped at that point
and upheld the petitioners' cumulative punishments under the challenged statutes since cumulative punishments can presumptively be assessed after conviction for two offenses that are not the 'same' under
Blockburger." 34 In Albernaz the Court instead went on to state: "[T]he
question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is no different from the question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose
multiple punishment, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution . '3 5 Chief Justice Burger reasoned in Hunter that the Whalen and
Albemaz decisions "lead inescapably to the conclusion [that] simply because two criminal statutes may be construed to proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger test does not mean that the Double Jeopardy
29 445 U.S. at 693-94. The defendant appealed the consecutive sentences imposed on
double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court held that rape and felony murder were the
same offense under the Blockburger test because the conviction for felony murder could not be
had without proving all the elements of the offense of rape. Id. at 694. The sentences were
overturned because the Court found that Congress, legislating for the District of Columbia,
had not intended punishment to be imposed for two offenses arising out of the same transaction unless one required proof of a fact which the other did not, i.e., were two separate offenses under the Blockburger test. Id. at 693. Although felony murder required proof of a fact
(death) not required to prove rape, the rape did not require proof of any fact that was not
required to prove the felony murder. The Blockburger test requires that each offense include a
fact that the other does not in order to constitute separate offenses. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at
304.
30 Id. at 691.
31 Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 678.
32 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
33 Id. at 339.
34 Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 678.
35 Albemnaz, 450 U.S. at 344, quoted in Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 679 (emphasis added by Chief
Justice Burger) (footnote omitted).
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Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punish36
ments pursuant to those statutes."
In Whalen, Albernaz, and Hunter, the Court has expressed a common
theme: legislative intent controls in defining crimes and fixing punishments. The holdings in these cases are in harmony with the Court's
position in the earliest case involving the issue. The Court first held in
Ex Parte Lange that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits imposition of
multiple punishments for a single offense. 37 On its facts, Lange did not
limit legislative discretion; it only limited judicial power to impose a
sentence more severe than the legislatively prescribed maximum.
More recently, in North Carolina v. Pearce, the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense."' 38 One commentator has interpreted Pearce as holding
that the Double Jeopardy Clause also prohibits courts from imposing
39
penalties that are excessive as defined by the sentencing authority.
The defendant's original conviction was reversed after he had spent two
and one-half years in jail. At his second trial he was sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison and given no credit for the time he had already served. Thus, his total prison time would have been twenty-seven
and one-half years. The Supreme Court reversed the twenty-five year
sentence, even though the total sentence of twenty-seven and one-half
years was less than the legislatively prescribed maximum of thirty
years.4 Under the Whalen analysis, Pearce could have been sentenced
to up to thirty years total prison time without a double jeopardy violation. If double jeopardy serves only to prohibit courts from imposing
penalties greater than those prescribed by the legislature, then Pearce's
sentence should have been affirmed. 4 1 Although Pearce does not limit
legislative discretion per se, it does imply that the double jeopardy anal36 Id. at 679.
37 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). Lange was convicted of an offense for which the penalty
was a maximum of one year in prison or a $200 fine, but he was mistakenly sentenced to both.
When the sentence was appealed, the trial judge set aside the original sentence and imposed
another prison term without taking into account that Lange had already paid the fine. Id. at
164. The Supreme Court reversed the prison sentence, holding that even though the fine had
been paid under an illegal sentence, Lange could not be punished further under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 175; see also Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theoy of DoubleJeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 107.
38 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
39 Westen & Drubel, supra note 37, at 109.
40 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 719. Another issue in Pearce was whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibited a court from imposing a more severe sentence upon reconviction than the
defendant originally received. The Court held that this was not constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 723.
41 See Westen & Drubel, supra note 37, at 109; see also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969); Williams v. Wainwright, 650 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Clayton,
588 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Best, 571 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978)(heavier
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ysis goes beyond a simple inquiry as to whether the court has sentenced
in accord with the applicable statute.
In a number of cases after Pearce and before Whalen, the Court in
dicta indicated that the Double Jeopardy Clause might limit a state's
power to create distinct statutory offenses punishing the same criminal
act. For example, in Simpson a. UnitedStates,42 the Court said, "[C]ases in
which the government is able to prove violations of two separate criminal statutes with precisely the same factual showing. . . raise the prospect of double jeopardy." '4 3 InJefers v. United States," the Court added,
"[I]f some possibility exists that the two statutory offenses are the 'same
offense' for double jeopardy purposes. . . it is necessary to examine the
problem more closely, in order to avoid Constitutional multiple punish45
ment difficulties."
Thus, the Court in Whalen and Albernaz was retreating from the
logical implication of Pearce and the language of Jeers and Simpson.
The Court was instead focussing more on legislative intent, as it did in
1873 with Lange. The Hunter opinion finally makes clear that because
the Missouri Supreme Court in Sours II construed the armed criminal
action statute and armed robbery to constitute the same offense, 46 and
because the court found that the legislature clearly intended that a convicted criminal be sentenced under both statutes, 47 double jeopardy
considerations do not bar the imposition of penalties under both
statutes.
IV. JUSTICES MARSHALL AND STEVENS IN DISSENT
The majority's reliance on Whalen and Albemaz as compelling precedent in deciding Hunter was misplaced. Justice Marshall, who joined
the Whalen opinion, pointed out in his dissent in Hunter that the Court in
Whalen "had no occasion to decide and did not decide, whether multiple punishments. . . can be imposed if clearly authorized by the legislature."' 4s He quoted other language from the Whalen opinion, ignored by
the majority: "The Double Jeopardy Clause at the veg least precludes
federal courts from imposing consecutive sentences unless authorized by
sentence on retrial after appellate reversal, absent vindictiveness, does not violate double
jeopardy).
42 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
43

Id. at 11.

44 432 U.S. 137 (1977)(plurality opinion).
45 Id. at 155.

46 603 S.W.2d at 598.
47 Id.
48 103 S. Ct. at 681 n.3 (Marshall J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Congress to do so,"'49 implying that when the issue was faced in a later
case the Court might just as easily have held that the double jeopardy
clause prohibits such statutes. Thus, the result in Hunter, in Justice Marshall's view, is not compelled by the Whalen holding, as the majority
argues.
The language of Albemaz that the Chief Justice found so compelling
is clearly dicta, as Justice Marshall also pointed out. 50 Albemaz involved
51
separate punishments for different crimes under the Blockburger test.
The Constitution does not prohibit imposing separate punishments for
such separate crimes. 52 Thus, Albemaz was unrelated to the issue of multiple punishments for the same offense presented in Hunter. In Albernaz,
the only issue was whether the convictions arose out of the same offense
under the Blockburger test. Once the Court found that the conspiracies
charged were really two distinct offenses it should simply have confirmed the convictions.
Justices Marshall and Stevens, in dissent, also criticized the majority's overall view of double jeopardy. 53 First, they explained that it is
well-settled that Hunter's prosecution under these two statutes in separate trials for the same offense would plainly have violated the dotlble
56
55
jeopardy clause. 54 The Court in Harisv. Oklahoma and Brown v. Ohio
49 Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689, quoted in Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 681 n.3 (emphasis added by
Justice Marshall).
50 Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51 Albemraz, 450 U.S. at 339.
52 See id. at 344 (the imposition of consecutive sentences for violations of separate statutes
does not violate the double jeopardy clause); United States v. Bangert, 645 F.2d 1297, 1307
(8th Cir. 1981) (ifact is punishable under two separate statutes and requires proof of two sets
of facts, cumulative sentencing is appropriate); United States v. Caston, 615 F.2d 1111, 1117
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980)(cumulative punishment may be imposed for acts
constituting violations of two separate statutory provisions); United States v. Ortiz-Martinez,
557 F.2d 214, 216 (9th Cir. 1977) (Congress may authorize cumulative sentences for a single
act that violates more than one statute when the offenses are not identical).
53 103 S. Ct. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54 Id.
55 433 U.S. 682 (1977)(per curiam). InHarris, the Court held that "when as here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery
with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one." Id. at 682.
56 432 U.S. 161 (1977). The Court held that the Double Jeopiardy Clause barred prosecution and punishment for auto theft after the defendant had already been tried, convicted, and
punished for the lesser included offense of operating the vehicle without the owner's consent.
The Court found that, under the Blockburger test, the crimes of "joyriding" (operating a vehicle without the owner's consent) and auto theft (joyriding with intent permanently to deprive
the owner of possession) constituted the same statutory offense because the former was a lesser
included offense of the latter. Id. at 168. Even though the charges had focused on different
parts of a nine-day interval between the time of the theft and the defendant's apprehension,
there was still only one offense, for which the defendant could not be prosecuted a second
time.
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clearly held that under most circumstances, a defendant may not be

57
retried for the same elements once the initial trial has been concluded.
Justices Marshall and Stevens argue that the majority opinion bypasses

this prohibition, and allows prosecutors to achieve the result forbidden
by Haris and Brown by bringing all charges in a single trial. They do
not believe that "the same offense should be interpreted to mean one
thing for purposes of the prohibition against multiple prosecutions and
something else for purposes of the prohibition against multiple
punishment."5 8
Double jeopardy theory holds that the ordeal of multiple trials is
the primary evil to be guarded against. 59 The defendant is entitled to
have his entire case finally decided by the jury first sworn to hear it.60 A
state should not be allowed to use its superior resources in multiple attempts to convict the defendant. 6' The policy that all charges arising
57 That is, one may not be retried for the same elements following acquittal, United States
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1892), following conviction and punishment, Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161 (1977), or following appellate reversal for insufficient evidence. Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1 (1977). A defendant may be retried following appellate reversal based on the
weight of the evidence, Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982), or if a mistrial is declared, unless
the defendant can prove that prosecutorial misconduct was intended to and did force the
defendant to move for mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 102 S. Ct. 2083 (1982); see Note, A)Fth
Amendment-TwiceJeopardizingthe Rights ofthe Accused" The Supreme Court's Tibbs and Kennedy
Decisions, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1474 (1982).
58 Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 680; see, e.g., O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir.
1972) (ifstate cannot constitutionally obtain two separate convictions for the same act at separate trials, it cannot do so at the same trial).
59 In Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977), the Court said that the guarantee
against double jeopardy assures an individual that among other things, he will not be forced,
with certain exceptions, to endure the personal strain, public embarassment, and expense of a
criminal trial more than once for the same offense. See also United States v. Join, 400 U.S.
470, 479 (1971); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); United States ex rel.
Stewart v. Redman, 470 F. Supp. 50, 56 (D.C. Del. 1979).
Justice Brennan has always believed that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that the
prosecution bring all charges arising out of one criminal act or transaction in a single proceeding, except in very limited circumstances. If that is done, then double jeopardy requirements
are satisfied. See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 683 (1976)(per curiam)(Brennan, J.,
concurring); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and
cases cited therein. Justice Brennan's view has not been adopted by the Court. See, e.g., Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-45 (1970); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1977) (Double Jeopardy Clause does not require a state to join in a
single proceeding all charges arising from one criminal episode or transaction).
60 The deprivation of the defendant's right to have a verdict rendered by the first jury
sworn to hear his case is what distinguishes the possibly impermissible retrial after a mistrial is
declared over the defendant's objection from a permissible retrial after the defendant's successful appeal. The defendant has a "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1970) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 689 (1949)).
61 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
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out of a single criminal transaction should be brought in a single trial is
so strong that a number of states require this by statute. 62 The majority
opinion follows this traditional view of double jeopardy. Chief Justice
Burger does not see that appellate courts have a role beyond ensuring
that all charges are brought in a single proceeding, and that trial courts
respect legislatively prescribed maximum sentences. Since the interests
of the defendant in avoiding multiple trials and in having his case heard
by the first jury sworn are met when multiple charges are brought in a
single trial, there may be justification for allowing in a single trial what
would be prohibited in multiple trials. Under the traditional view of
double jeopardy, the majority is correct, but it fails to consider other
important rights of defendants.
While Justice Marshall does not disagree that multiple trials for the
same criminal act are a major concern of double jeopardy analysis, he
also believes that there is a strong interest against multiple convictions
for the same criminal act. He admits that the "[S]tate has wide latitude
to define crimes and to prescribe the punishment for a given crime," and
that the "[S]tate is free to prescribe two different punishments (e.g., a
fine and a prison term) for a single offense." '63 Justice Marshall argues,
however, that the Constitution does not permit a State to punish as two
crimes conduct that constitutes a single offense. 64 Thus, while the majority emphasizes the sentence, Justice Marshall's concern is the extra
65
conviction.
The government in its amicus brief argued that because the legislature could simply have prescribed a harsher sentence for a single crime,
the same sentence imposed for two convictions was functionally
equivalent. 66 Because additional stigma results from each conviction,
however, a statutory scheme that permits the prosecution to obtain two
convictions and two sentences is not equivalent to a statute that permits
62 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 3-3, 3-4(b)(1) (1981) (compulsory joinder statute).
63 Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64 Id. A number of states prohibit double punishment for a single criminal offense by
statute. See, e.g., ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-116 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West
1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-301 (1983); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4 (1982); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.035 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25(A)(1979); OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 11
(1971).
Other state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to prohibit double punishment for the same offense. See, e.g., State v. Vincent, 387 So. 2d 1097, 1101 (La. 1980); People
v. Jankowski, 408 Mich. 79, 289 N.W.2d 674, 678 (1980); Conner v. Griffith, 238 S.E.2d 529
(1977); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONsT. art. I, § 15; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 15; N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5.
65 The extra conviction was also the concern of the Michigan Supreme Court when, in
People v. Jankowski, 408 Mich. 79, 289 N.W.2d 674, 680 (1980), it held that the double
punishment problem could not be solved by the vacation of the multiple sentences leaving the
convictions standing.
66 Hunter, 103 S.Ct. at 681; Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 18-19.
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only a single conviction, but imposes a similar or even a harsher sentence. 67 Moreover, because the State could impose the longer sentence
upon conviction for a single crime, there is no legitimate purpose in
seeking multiple convictions and multiple punishments. 68
Justice Marshall pointed out that "[i]f the Double Jeopardy Clause
imposed no restrictions on a legislature's power to authorize multiple
punishment, there would be no limit to the number of convictions that a
State could obtain on the basis of the same act, state of mind, and result."'69 He believes that the power of the State to bring multiple
charges increases the risk that the defendant will be convicted. The defendant must defend against and obtain acquittal on each charge; the
prosecutor need obtain only a single conviction. There is more opportunity for a compromise verdict if all the jurors are not convinced by the
State's case.70 The jury may believe that with so many charges, the defendant must be guilty of something. 7 1 There is a real danger here, because courts generally will uphold an adequately supported conviction
despite apparent inconsistency in the findings of guilty and not guilty on
different counts of a two-count indictment. Great deference is accorded
72
jury verdicts even when they are apparently based on compromise.
In further support of his argument that the extra conviction violates double jeopardy, Justice Marshall pointed out that each separate
criminal conviction may have collateral consequences. 73 The convictions on multiple charges arising out of a single act may subject an of67 103 S. Ct. at 681.
68 Id; see infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.

69 103 S. Ct. at 680. For example, in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), a defendant
was tried for robbing one of six poker players. When the jury acquitted him because the
prosecution's evidence was weak, the state re-indicted the defendant for the robbery of a
second of the six. The Court stated that this effort by the prosecutor to hone his trial strategy
and identify and cure weaknesses in his case through successive trials was impermissible. Id.
at 447, 448 (Brennan, J., concurring).
70 103 S. Ct. at 681; see a/so Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966)(Fortas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). As Justice Marshall explains, although the risk of a compromise
verdict is also present when the lesser included offense as well as the greater offense is submitted to the jury, the risk is reduced by the rule that the lesser included offense will not be
submitted to the jury if the distinguishing element is not in dispute. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 681
n.4; see also Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965); United States v. Tsana, 572 F.2d
340 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
71 103 S. Ct. at 681 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72 See United States v. Lichtenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1279-80 (5th Cir.), cert.denied, 447 U.S.
907 (1980)juries in criminal cases are free to render verdicts that are inconsistent, or even the
result of mistake or compromise); Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706 (D.C. App. 1976) (law
permits a jury to acquit in disregard of the evidence; such an acquittal is unreviewable). But
see Cross v. State, 374 A.2d 620, 623, re'd on other grounds, 386 A.2d 747 (Md. 1977)(legally
inconsistent verdict could not stand).
73 103 S. Ct. at 681; see, e.g., O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199 (lst Cir. 1972)(adverse consequences of conviction include habitual offender status, use to impeach testimony,
extra stigma); see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
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fender to sentencing under a habitual offender statute. 7 4 Each
conviction itself, moreover, represents a moral condemnation by the
5
community-a pronouncement that a wrong has been committed.7
Each conviction increases the stigma and damage to the defendant's
reputation resulting from this moral condemnation. Thus, the dissenters are correct in arguing that the extra conviction is as much a double
jeopardy concern as is the number of trials the defendant may be forced
to endure.
Justice Marshall's concerns are legitimate ones, but may be answered in the future by the eighth amendment 76 or the Due Process
Clause, 7 7 rather than by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court has
recognized in a number of cases that sentence length, where not rationally related to the type of crime, may violate the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 78 The eighth
amendment in this context clearly limits the discretion of the legislature
in prescribing punishments for various crimes. 79 Although the eighth
amendment has never been tested in the context of an unduly harsh
40, 53-58 (1967); Grant, LeCorner, Pickens, Rivkin & Vinson, CollateralCons-equences of a Crzininal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970).
74 Missouri defines a persistent offender as "one who has ... been found guilty of two or
more felonies committed at different times." Mo. STAT. ANN. § 558.016 (Vernon 1982).
Thus, Justice Marshall's concern does not appear to be a problem in Missouri. See also Indiana Habitual Offender Statute, IND. CODE § 35-50-2-8 (Supp. 1983)(habitual offender status
requires two prior unrelated felony convictions).
75 Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).
76 The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
77 The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
" U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
78 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955)(punishment appropriate for the diverse
federal offenses is a matter for the discretion of Congress, subject only to constitutional limitations, more particularly the eighth amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910). The Court in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1979), noted in discussing these cases,
however, that "[i]n recent years this proposition has appeared most frequently in opinions
dealing with the death penalty." Id. at 272.
79 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See generaloy, Westen & Drubel,supra note
37, at 114-15; Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Cruel and Unusual Punishments-EighthAmendment Prohibits Excessively Long Sentences, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 637 (1975); see also United States v.
Johnson, 612 F.2d 843, 845, 847 (4th Cir. 1979)(eighth amendment may limit Congress' discretion to define units of prosecution; Double Jeopardy Clause does not) (quoting Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82-83 (1955)). The cruel and unusual punishment provision forbids the imposition of certain types of punishment, proscribes punishment which is grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime, and imposes some limits on what may be made
criminal and punished. Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977)). North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), may be
interpreted to imply that the legislatively prescribed sentence of 30 years was excessive for the
crime committed. Otherwise, Pearce's total sentence, including time served pending appeal,
of 27 1/2 years should have been affirmed. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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sentence as the result of conviction of more than one statutory crime
based on a single criminal act, the Court's past treatment of overly severe sentences seems to indicate that such unbridled discretion in the
legislature might be limited by the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.8 0
The Due Process Clause might also be held to invalidate statutory
schemes that define too many separate crimes based on single criminal
acts, if such definitions could not be found to be rationally related to
legitimate state objectives. 8 ' The Court has seldom applied the Due
Process Clause to criminal statutes.8 2 Since Missouri could have prescribed the sentence of twenty years which Hunter received for two convictions as the sentence for violation of a single statute, no legitimate
state objective was achieved by convicting Hunter twice.8 3 Because the
80 In Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983), the Supreme Court reversed a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for passing a "no account" check under South
Dakota's recidivist statute. The Court reaffirmed that the eighth amendment proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed. Id. at 3006. Justice Powell wrote
for the Court, and Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented. Justice Powell distinguished the case from Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980),
while the dissenters argued that Rummel directly controlled Solem. So/em, 103 S. Ct. at 3017.
In Rwnmel, the Court held that a life sentence imposed upon a conviction for a theft of
$120.75 under the Texas recidivist statute was constitutional. 445 U.S. at 285. Justice Powell
argued in So/em that Rummel's eligibility for parole was the distinguishing factor of the previous case. So/em, 103 S. Ct. at 3015-16. The defendant in So/em, however, could have appealed for executive clemency.
Both So/em and Rummel were five to four decisions. Justice Blackmun may simply have
changed his mind. The issue quite clearly is still unsettled.
81 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (prosecutor's discretion to re-indict a defendant
on a felony charge after his conviction and successful appeal on misdemeanor charge is circumscribed by the due process clause); Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978), afd,
445 U.S. 263 (1980), on remand, 498 F.Supp. 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (the legislature selects the
punishment scheme for criminal statutes and the court is justified in striking down the legislature's choice only when it is demonstrated that that choice has no rational basis and is totally
and utterly rejected in modern thought); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 297 (5th Cir.
1977) (due process clause may impose some as-yet undetermined limit on a state's constitutional power to classify and punish a course of conduct as several distinct offenses).
82 The Court is now most reluctant to strike down statutes on this ground, which necessitates passing judgment on the wisdom of the legislative scheme. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 136-38 (1972).
83 Substantive due process might temper the legislature's power to prescribe criminal penalties by invalidating sentencing schemes that bear no substantial relationship to a legitimate
public interest. The chance of substantive due process considerations arising, however, are
remote. The Supreme Court has only employed this doctrine to strike down criminal statutes
prohibiting specific activities. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 82, at 137, 137 n.6.
The Court has never held that the severity of a sentence imposed under a valid statute violates due process. Id. Moreover, beginning with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934),
the Court generally has refrained from invalidating any statutes on substantive due process
grounds. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1975), and cases cited
therein.
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statutory scheme lacks justification, it might very well violate the Due
84
Process Clause.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Missouriv. Hunter, the Court has brought together the elements of

Whalen and Albemaz in an unequivocal ruling that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not limit the discretion of Congress or state legislatures
either in defining crimes or in prescribing punishments for those crimes
once defined.8 5 Thus, apparently legislatures can define many crimes
based on the same elements, prescribe a different punishment for each,
and provide that defendants convicted of multiple violations based on
the same criminal act may be sentenced consecutively. Whether such
practices, when carried to the extreme, will be found to violate either
the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, or the fifth and fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process
of law, remains to be seen.
DEBORAH L. SCHMIr-

84 In State v. Kaufman, 265 N.W.2d 610, 618 (Iowa 1978), the Iowa Supreme Court held
that a conviction on the lesser included as well as the greater offense violated both double
jeopardy and due process.
85 It may be argued that the double jeopardy clause does indirectly limit legislatures in
defining crimes and punishments because it demands a certain minimum clarity in drafting
statutes. Unless legislative intent is crystal clear, the "rule of lenity" constitutionalized in
Whalen mandates reversal of a cumulative sentence. See Westen & Drubel, .upra note 37, at
118.

